The United States faces a global strategic challenge: how to counter China's expanding influence, advance US national interests, and support sovereign development in key regions. This is not just a matter of foreign aid or trade agreements, it is a test of whether America can compete economically and diplomatically in the modern world. To compete and win, the U.S. needs an Integrated Economic Statecraft Strategy, a globally coordinated effort to align diplomacy, information-sharing, security cooperation, and economic tools under a unified framework.
Nowhere is this challenge more urgent, or more illustrative, than in Africa. The continent’s young population, critical mineral reserves, and rapidly growing markets make it a high-value target in the global contest for markets and influence. Indeed, Africa will account for a quarter of the world’s population by 2050, over half of global population growth in the next 25 years1, while its combined consumer and business spending could exceed $16 trillion by mid-century.”2 Despite Africa’s growing relevance, the U.S. is challenged to engage there, hindered by fragmented policy tools, disjointed agency missions, and a reactive strategy. The US excels in mature, but relatively shrinking markets, but struggles to compete in less mature but growing economies. These are symptoms of a broader shortfall in how Washington conducts economic statecraft. Africa is the leading edge of a global problem.
China understands this. Its approach to economic statecraft fuses commercial, diplomatic, and security objectives into one coherent campaign. China’s model had real appeal: it brings rapid execution of projects and provides much needed capital to nations eager to develop. For some states, China also provides a level of financial opacity that would not survive the scrutiny of more transparent western capital formation avenues. Using state-owned enterprises, concessional loans, and infrastructure-for-resources deals, Beijing secures control over ports, access to critical minerals, and digital infrastructure, often on terms that weaken local sovereignty and grant China exclusive access to key value chains. While African nations gain roads and railways, they also are burdened with debt, opaque contracts, and long-term strategic dependency.
This approach isn’t limited to Africa. In Latin America, the Pacific Islands, Southeast Asia, and even Eastern Europe, China’s strategy is the same: offer bundled incentives, avoid governance requirements, and make quick inroads where Western coordination lags. The real risk is not that China’s model is attractive, it’s that the U.S. fails to offer a credible alternative.
The U.S. has unmatched tools for supporting resilient, sovereign development: transparent financing, rule-of-law standards, risk-reduction mechanisms, and a powerful private sector. But these tools are uncoordinated across departments and agencies, rarely unified behind a common strategic goal. While China coordinates economic power through state control, the U.S. must do so through interagency integration and public-private synergy. It is harder, but more sustainable, and far more appealing to sovereign nations.
An integrated economic statecraft model should rest on four pillars of coordination:
Diplomatic Coordination A National Security Council–led task force should guide U.S. regional campaigns, ensuring embassies, finance agencies, and development actors operate from a shared playbook. In Africa, this means linking U.S. trade initiatives, infrastructure support, and governance aid with strategic engagement that responds to local priorities that align with U.S. national interests. Globally, the same model applies: align efforts in regions where economic leverage is becoming a strategic battleground.
Control the Information Terrain. Poor data transparency deters investment, both in Africa and elsewhere. The U.S. can lead by collecting and sharing reliable market intelligence, enabling private-sector entry where fear of corruption or risk has frozen capital. At the same time, Washington must confront Chinese disinformation, claims that U.S. institutions are unreliable, disengaged, or self-interested. The truth is that U.S. tools, when properly applied, support genuine development and long-term sovereignty. That message must be broadcast consistently.
Integrate Security with Development. U.S. military engagement abroad should support economic goals. In Africa, this means securing trade corridors and mineral routes vital to global supply chains. The same logic applies in Southeast Asia or Central America, where gray-zone actors threaten stability. Defense and diplomacy must work together to create secure environments for investment and growth.
Leverage Financial Tools Strategically. U.S. financial tools must be deployed with strategic intent, and with a clear focus on mobilizing private capital. Washington’s greatest untapped advantage lies in its ability to structure and de-risk markets in ways that attract deep pools of private investment. Agencies like the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) can lower barriers to entry through political risk insurance and first-loss guarantees. The Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) has the potential to channel investment into dual-use infrastructure and critical mineral corridors, but only if backed by a coordinated strategy. Public funding should serve as a catalyst, not a substitute, creating transparent, rules-based environments where private capital can flow with confidence. By focusing on bankability, governance, and blended finance mechanisms, the U.S. can outcompete opaque alternatives while supporting lasting, market-led development. To coordinate these efforts, Washington should establish an Economic Statecraft Integration Cell. This interagency body would operate at the regional level, beginning in Africa but expanding to other contested areas. Its mission would be to plan and execute integrated economic campaigns, linking disparate initiatives into a unified strategy. Rather than duplicating existing roles, it would serve as the connective tissue between agencies, ensuring unity of effort and clarity of purpose.
An integrated model of this kind would put pressure on Beijing where it is most vulnerable: cost and coherence. China’s system is resource-intensive, discards the intense risk scrutiny of market solutions, and is increasingly overextended. Coordinated U.S. engagement would force Beijing to respond on multiple fronts, while offering partner nations a credible and values-aligned alternative.
Many of these countries want just that, transparent partnerships, durable infrastructure, and inclusive growth. They are wary of coercive terms and opaque contracts. U.S. institutions offer a more sustainable path forward. But without a unified U.S. strategy, the quick and easy path offered through Sino-Mercantilism wins the competition.
Africa is the starting point because the stakes are high and the demand for alternatives is growing. But the model must be global. The same integrated approach will be needed to counter strategic influence in the Pacific Islands, to compete in Latin America’s energy sector, or to maintain access to rare earths in Southeast Asia. Washington’s posture must evolve from isolated initiatives to campaign-driven engagement across all theaters of interest. Establishing an Economic Statecraft Integration Task Force is the next step. It offers a structure for turning U.S. strengths into strategic leverage, and for imposing asymmetric costs on competitors without abandoning American values.
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Marcus Snow has worked extensively in the defense economics, stabilization, and investment management arena. He is the former co-owner of a small investment management firm and a retired Colonel from the US Army Reserves.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects 2024 Revision. 2024. United Nations, https://population.un.org/wpp/. Accessed 16 Aug. 2025.↩︎
Gaither, Kendra L. “Great Expectations.” The Foreign Service Journal, vol. 99, no. 7, Sept. 2022, p. 35.↩︎