1. Introduction

One of the reasons that the United States and its allies have had difficulty mobilizing resources against China’s hybrid warfare activities is that they often do not align with our definition of war. Our institutions are designed to manage state capabilities through the familiar DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic) framework, not against hybrid threats. The result is a growing mismatch between how we think about these challenges and vulnerabilities.

In 2003, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) commissioned the “Political Work Guidelines of the People’s Liberation Army,” wherein they expressed their intent to wage “three warfares” (psychological, media, and legal) and outlined their intent to undermine global norms via “war by other means” (Office of Net Assessment). In addition to the three warfares, China quietly expanded its economic spheres of influence and now leverages their capabilities for economic warfare (Cha). Over the past twenty years they have earned market share in varying domains of power through coordinated activities. Approaching them in silos is ineffective.

To simplify, these four domains have been grouped into two categories; 1) cultural domains (psychological and media), and 2) institutional domains (legal and economic) (Alesina and Giuliano). Activities in cultural domains attack beliefs, whereas activities in institutional domains attack rules of order. To bring awareness to these threats I address current weaknesses in these domains, how we ended up in this position, how we missed the warning signs of an expanding campaign , and conclude with thoughts on how to defend ourselves.

2. Weak Points and Strong

“Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected” (Tzu).

China approaches hybrid warfare using a historic lens. A whole of society approach to deception, disinformation, and irregular warfare has a place in their strategic tradition; whereas seeing war as “an act of violence to compel our enemy to fulfill our will,” shapes traditions in the West (von Clausewitz). Our defence apparatus is designed to fight wars with guns, tanks, planes, and ships, not with economic spheres of influence.

Culture

Despite damages that could be attributed to irregular warfare, there are often no direct casualties or destruction of property. As a result, China faces little or no consequences for what they have defined as psychological and media warfare. There is mounting evidence that China works with Russia and other adversaries to sow division between Americans and disrupt our social order (Berg and Ziemer). Currently there is an insufficient force dedicated to challenge the narratives that infiltrate our national discussions at the behest of our adversaries. The U.S. Army is standing up Theater Information Advantage Detachments (TIAD) to operate in the “information and cognitive domains”; however, these efforts need to be a part of a broader whole of society approach to defend against cultural threats (Smith).

Institutions

Institutions that offer free market benefits to the ‘rest of world’ have been undermined using legal and economic instruments. American defense capabilities are underprepared to defend against CCP legal and economic warfare. Pentagon attorneys have had difficulty challenging Chinese actions, such as land reclamation projects creating new islands which are used to house airfields, submarine docks, troops, and more in the Pacific (Southerland). China Shipping did not adopt required environmental regulations at the Port of Los Angeles in 2002, putting the City of Los Angeles at the center of a 20 year legal battle, but still holds the lease until 2039. Additionally, COSCO was forced to sell their shares in the Pacific Container Terminal, but they still operate it as a part of a joint venture, through a concession that has been extended to 2042 (Banach and Gunter).

3. Attack by Strategem

“He who is prudent and lies in wait for an enemy who is not, will be victorious” (Tzu)

China began their path to increase cultural and institutional power in the late 1990s and reinforced it with contracts. Through acquisitions of ports, mines, and critical infrastructure, China quietly made inroads into the global economy and now exerts unparalleled influence over global supply chains (Martin et al).

Culture

The CCP and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) have units designed to wage psychological and media warfare. Base 311 of the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) has specialized in propaganda and psychological warfare against Taiwan since 2005 (Kania). The aggressive use of media to create confusion and tamper opposition has been widely used, recently to discredit the COVID-19 intelligence (Smith) and elections in Taiwan (Min-Chen Lee). Australia and New Zealand have also been the targets of political influence, carried out by the United Front Work Department (UFWD). Canada has also seen increased CCP interference in elections and meddling in domestic politics (Ljunggren and Berkrot). The CCP has even used domestic data security laws to compel foreign firms to hand over data, further fueling psychological and media warfare (CIS Cyber Threat Intelligent Team).

Institutions

After its entry into the WTO in 2001 China has used the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and its predecessors, to acquire and control a number of supply chain choke points throughout The Americas and Europe. Additionally, Chinese courts have issued orders regarding foreign patent holders preventing them from litigating Chinese companies infringing on intellectual property (Gupta and Cohen). The CCP engages in legal warfare by changing domestic laws and pushing international laws to extend influence. Current issues surrounding the shoals and reefs located between the Philippines and Vietnam are a prime example of China pressing the limits of international law and attempting to create their own (Magramo and Gan).

4. Use of Force

“In the midst of chaos, there is also opportunity” (Tzu)

Although the Department of Defense (DoD) has undergone countless changes to better combat terrorism, it has come at the expense of preparing for a near peer conflict (Cropsey and Halem). Prior to COVID-19, the U.S. government had behaved as if it were blind to rising threats of Chinese mercantilism.

Culture

As the US focused on the Middle East, the Taliban, China and Russia were quietly coming together often unchallenged. Although cooperating with counter terrorism efforts on their border, China propped themselves up to be the regional mediator. Between 2001 and 2017, China has given over $250 million in aid to Afghanistan. China cultivated a relationship with the Taliban, blamed the U.S. for causing instability, and stepped into the power vacuum. China has discreetly worked for over 20 years to discredit and undermine the U.S., e.g. the Afghanistan withdrawal, Wikileaks (Iasiello) and sow American political instability (Kurlantzick).

Institutions

After the global financial crisis China provided financing where others would not (Rajvanshi). When these governments are burdened by changing economic conditions, the CCP leverages their position to gain more control, leaving the host nation with few options (Condon). When plans do work out, China is seen as a lifeline. These tactics have expanded China’s global geoeconomic footprint and made their spheres of influence more resilient to American interventions.

5. On Strategy in General

“Two qualities are indispensable ~ coup d’œil and resolution” (von Clausewitz)

How do we fight back? Preparing for near peer war is one of our greatest deterrents; however, our other greatest deterrent is our economic potential. Our adversaries have worked to create a tenuous environment and disrupt historic economic alliances. Clausewitz determined the need for clear information with a rapid refresh to make intuitive decisions as well as the courage to act swiftly.

Coup d’œil

We cannot control what we cannot measure. Endless accounts and figures from the left/right and religious/social organizations attacking each other, gutting of American manufacturing and disrupting relationships with historic allies; all celebrated by our adversaries. We need measures to know we are making progress and to inform the public of those measures, encouraging them to get on board. Educating the public on the dangers and actions being taken against them, with actionable steps to fight back would be a great place to start, but we need better data to make our case. The idea with coup d’œil here is to have a culture wherein we recognize threats expeditiously and instinctively make the right decisions.

Resolution

In government and defense, there have been recent efforts to fight back. However, these efforts need to be a whole of government approach and fought with the tenacity that we fight our wars with. We need empowered offices dedicated to defending against cultural and institutional attacks as the four warfares are the front lines of an irregular battlefield at the moment. These offices could take many forms, such as an Economic Warfare Division inside the Department of War, a bipartisan office dedicated to combating misinformation online, etc. Our government needs to be able to act quickly, decisively, and effectively being resolute in their actions and using the full scope of tools available to America.

6. Conclusion

We have seen China act aggressively with their economy; coercive trade policies , industrial espionage, etc (Leslie and Rosado-Rivera). We know China has gained control over dozens of container ports (Banach and Gunter), and we believe them to be making the ports dual-purpose for their military (Hammes), but more research needs to get into the hands of decision makers.

Less emic, and more etic. Each of the four warfares deserves its own empirical analysis followed by an aggregate study on how they complement one another as a part of a broader campaign. These analyses are beyond the scope of this article, but necessary to encourage operations capable of assessing how the channels of attack interact and for measuring the success of our collective defense. This article has been developed as a retrospective to inform those that are unaware, and to act as a call to action for better measures of success and failure among those that are aware.

Michael DiBernardo is a FORESIGHT (Forecasting and Operational Research on Emerging Security, Intelligence Gathering and Hybrid Threats) Lab Fellow with Aletheia Research Institution and is an Officer in the U.S. Air Force. He holds an M.B.A. and a B.A. in Economics.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent the official views or policies of the U.S. Government or any of its agencies.